SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
The legal picture in the State of New Jersey has undergone
marked changes within the past year. Both the judiciary and the
legislature have contributed to noted developments, particularly in
such areas as Criminal Law and Procedure, Constitutional Law,
and Family Law. In the interests of brevity and clarity, the Seton
Hall Law Review will attempt to present a convenient synopsis of
some of these noteworthy developments. In so doing, we hope to
aid and assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of
the more interesting changes in certain significant areas of practice.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACY -McKenna
Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978).

v.

Five applicants for the position of fireman in Jersey City challenged the constitutionality of the municipality's psychological testing.
The pyschological evaluations were designed to measure an applicant's ability to endure the pressures inherent in this line of work.
The named defendants were the appointment supervisor of fire fighters, the Chief of the Jersey City Fire Department, and the Stevens
Institute of Technology, which was contracted by Jersey City to conduct the psychological tests.
The plaintiffs brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (West 1976). They alleged that the defendants, acting under
color of state law, deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments, violating their freedom of
belief and right to privacy.
After taking written and physical agility tests, in addition to medical examinations, the applicants were required to go to the Stevens
Institute of Technology to undergo a battery of personality assessment
instruments and interviews. Basic characteristics emphasized in this
series were calculated to infer how a particular individual would be
able to function under stress, cooperate with workers with whom he
or she may be living in close quarters, and comply with orders given
in stressful situations. Defendant Stevens Institute then made its recommendations to Jersey City concerning the applicants and although
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the city did not adopt the Institute's assessments as a matter of policy,
it appears that it did so in the majority of cases.
Senior District Judge Coolahan, in his opinion, explained the
psychological testing process in detail and further expounded upon
the validity and objective of these examinations. The court concluded
that the purpose of the tests was not geared to reject applicants based
on their religious, political and social beliefs, but rather such questions were utilized to measure significant emotional deviations against
a special norm for'policeman and fireman, as developed by the defendants. Recognizing that there should be close judicial scrutiny in
such testing in order to prevent possible abuse, the court found that
Jersey City's tests were in no way an attempt to exclude applicants
due to specific beliefs and, therefore, there was no infringement on
the freedom of belief.
With regard to the alleged infringement of the right to privacy,
the district court encountered some difficulty due to "[t]he confused
state of the constitutional doctrine of privacy." 451 F. Supp. at 1379.
This "confusion" was attributed to "the absence of a principle limiting
[the] scope" of a right to privacy. Id. The court determined that the
essence of the privacy question was the extent to which the applicants' interest in protecting the privacy of their psychological evalua-

tions warranted the due process protection accorded by the fourteenth amendment.
Judge Coolahan referred to the standard set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), to
establish the parameters of the constitutional right of privacy in dealing with disclosure of personal information to a governmental agency.
The court noted that the "nature and degree" to which the information could be disseminated to governmental employees was pivotal.
451 F. Supp. at 1381. The court indicated that Jersey City must justify its intrusion upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court
found that the defendants met their burden since the compelling interests of the city in protecting its citizens, property and the lives of
the applicants themselves served to vindicate the existence of the
tests. However, the court stated that all possible means should be
used to limit the access of the data to the defendants' employees.
It appears that where the court is in a position where it must
balance an individual's constitutional right to privacy when in pursuit
of certain categories of governmental employment with the public's
interest in protecting its citizens and community, the latter will ultimately and consistently prevail.
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SCHOOL DISTRICTS-

Guempel v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 166, 387 A.2d 399 (Law Div.
1978).
Robert Guempel was the father of a seventeen year old girl,
Linda, who was mentally retarded. She was only eligible for day
training within the meaning of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-9(c) (West
1968 & Curn. Supp. 1978-1979), which classifies mentally retarded
children for educational purposes. According to generally accepted
psychological classification, Linda was considered to be severely and
profoundly retarded. When Linda was four, her parents were unable
to provide for her basic life needs and care at home and consequently, they placed her in a private facility. In 1969, when the
private school could no longer cope with a case as difficult as hers,
Linda was admitted to the Hunterdon State School where she was
expected to remain for the rest of her life.
In previous proceedings, the plaintiff had been found to be a
legally responsible relative who must contribute to the costs of Linda's care in residential services in accordance with his financial ability
pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.3 (West Cum. Supp. 19781979) and related statutes. The plaintiff, a business executive with an
annual income in excess of $100,000, had been ordered to pay the full
amount which was approximately $12,000 a year.
Plaintiff brought this action claiming that by charging him for the
cost of Linda's care at the Hunterdon State School, the State and
county disregarded the state constitutional mandate of providing "free
public schools for the instruction of all children . . . between the ages
of five and eighteen years" as given by the "thorough and efficient"
education clause, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, para. 1. 159 N.J.
Super. at 169, 387 A.2d at 400. He also'based his claim upon federal
statutes and regulations dealing with the funding of programs for the
education and rehabilitation of the handicapped.
The court held that N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, para. 1, did not
require the legislature or the state to provide any care, custody, or
safekeeping services for Linda. 159 N.J. Super. at 182, 387 A.2d at
407. Her mental deficiency was so profound that the state was excused by reason of impossibility from its general constitutional obligation to supply her with a thorough and efficient education in a free
public school. Whatever valuable services can be given to the severely or profoundly retarded residents of institutions like Hunterdon, they cannot be treated as educational .activities. Linda was not
admitted to the state school to be educated in any formal sense, but

1978]

SURVEY

to relieve her parents from the unreasonable burden of caring for her
at home. She had a statutory right to institutional care under N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-165.1 to .11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), but
that right was subject to a statutory duty to contribute to the cost of
such care whenever her financial circumstances or those of her family
permitted. The court also denied plaintiff any right to assert claims
under the federal Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§
1401 to 1461 (West 1978), and the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 794 (West 1975).
The plaintiff's contention that New Jersey's classification of mentally retarded persons created a suspect class within the meaning
of equal protection rules was rejected by the court. It maintained that
the classification system was based upon objective differences which
were not only functionally significant, but also imperative so that
these children would be given special treatment and protection.
The court did find, however, that the method of assessing institutional costs to the plaintiff violated equal protection principles,
but not because parents of children in a state school for the mentally
retarded carry heavier financial burdens than those imposed on parents of children in ordinary public schools. 159 N.J. Super. at 18586, 387 A.2d at 409. Instead, comparison of the treatment afforded to
retarded children assigned to day care centers with that afforded to
those placed in residential facilities was held to be more meaningful
and to implicate constitutional doctrines. The court found that the
treatment provided was essentially the same in both places. However, parents of children in day care were allowed a $5500 educational expense credit while those in residential schools were allowed
only $309.68. This difference, for which there was neither a rational
basis nor proper governmnental purpose, was held violative of equal
protection. Id. at 191, 387 A.2d at 412.
In the future, a deduction must be permitted for state school
residents "against their per capita costs equal to the average per
capita statewide sum being spent on a year-to-year basis for mentally
retarded children in the day care center program." Id. at 191-92, 387
A.2d at 412. As the court itself reflected, the practical impact of this
decision will not be very far reaching since less than ten per cent of
the total cost of care is recovered from residents and their families
statewide and very few pay the full adjusted per capita costs. Id. at
192, 387 A.2d at 412.
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OF EVIDENCE-State

v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 386 A.2d 378 (1978).
On August 6, 1973, Paul Sheldrick and Frank Sands became involved in an incident with one William White, with whom they had a
record of antagonism. In search of White, Sheldrick and Sands visited
a local tavern in which White and his wife were employed. Sheldrick
shot White with a sawed-off shotgun and then threatened the owner
of the tavern, who was also the decedent's father-in-law. After the
shooting occurred, Sands fled from the tavern. Local police officers,
who were in a nearby radio car, heard the gunshot and observed
smoke emanating from the tavern. The officers also noticed Sands
throw a pistol into an alley as he was fleeing the scene. The policemen arrested Sands and retrieved the pistol. Sheldrick, upon leaving
the tavern with the sawed-off shotgun in hand, was also arrested.
At trial, Sands did not testify. Sheldrick testified, however,
claiming that the gunshot wound which killed White was accidentally
inflicted. Over Sheldrick's objections, "prior convictions were admitted into evidence to affect his credibility." 76 N.J. at 132, 386 A.2d at
381. Defendant Sheldrick was found guilty of murder in the first degree, assault with an offensive weapon, threatening the life of another
and illegal possession of a firearm. Defendant Sands was found guilty
of murder in the second degree and illegal possession of a firearm.
The defendants appealed and the appellate division affirmed their
convictions. 138 N.J. Super. 103, 350 A.2d 274 (App. Div. 1975). The
defendants' petition for certification, limited to the question of admissibility of prior convictions to attack credibility, was granted. 71 N.J.
345, 364 A.2d 1077 (1976).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in an opinion by Justice
Schreiber, held that it was within the trial judge's sound discretion
whether a prior criminal conviction may be admitted into evidence.
76 N.J. at 144, 386 A.2d at 387. Furthermore, the defendant's statements that he did not testify at trial for "'fear lest his record of prior
offenses come to the attention of the jury'" were "unsupported and
unwarranted assertions conflict[ing] with reality." Id. at 145, 386 A.2d
at 387. Finally, the court believed that sound judicial discretion warranted admissibility of all the co-defendants' prior convictions. Id. at
146, 386 A.2d at 388.
Prior to the instant case, the New Jersey courts followed the
doctrine set forth in State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 149, 228 A.2d 682
(1967). Historically, evidence of prior convictions was admitted without
qualification to affect credibility. The burden of justifying the exclusion of such evidence would usually rest upon the defendant. As a
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result of Sands, the courts must now look to "remoteness" as the key
to exclusion of prior convictions. The mere passage of time should not
be determinative. A "significant factor" in the trial court's decision
must be the nature of the convictions. 76 N.J. at 144, 386 A.2d at
387. The trial court must, therefore, utilize a balancing test, weighing
the lapse of time and the nature of the crime "to determine whether
the relevance with respect to credibility outweighs the prejudicial effect against the defendant." Id. at 144-45, 386 A.2d at 387. Thus,
serious crimes, particularly those involving lack of veracity, dishonesty, or fraud will now be considered as having a "weightier effect"
than such convictions as death by reckless driving. Id. at 144, 386
A.2d at 387.
Additionally, the court, in interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8112 (West 1976), held that the statute does not mandate the admission
into evidence of every prior conviction. 76 N.J. at 146, 386 A.2d at
388. It is within the trial judge's discretion to allow evidence of criminal convictions which will affect the credibility of a criminal defendant. If, in his discretion, the trial judge decides that the "probative
force" of' such evidence, due to its remoteness, will undlly prejudice
the defendant, he should exclude it.
The ramifications of the court's decision are readily apparent.
The need for accuracy in our criminal justice system is directly addressed by the court's holding. Yet, more explicit guidelines might be
necessary to aid the trial judge in the proper exercise of his discretion. While juries should not be deprived of substantial probative
evidence, the trial judge must utilize cautionary measures so as not to
focus improperly on a defendant's "evil character." As Justice
Pashman so clearly stated, "a defendant deserves a trial on the
merits, not on his past demerits." Id. at 150, 386 A.2d at 390
(Pashman, J., concurring).

CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT AND BATTERY-State v. Crumedy, 76
N.J. 319, 387 A.2d 357 (1978).
Ernest Crumedy misrepresented himself as a physician and/or
representative of Blue Cross-Blue Shield authorized to conduct diagnostic tests. Under the guise of testing for sickle-cell anemia,
Crumedy inserted pins and needles into the arms of three victims. In
another instance, Crumedy used a flashlight to peer into a victim's
vagina, claiming to be looking for cancer. Crumedy went as far as to
tell some of the victims that they had cancer.
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Defendant Crumedy was convicted of atrocious assault and battery, among other charges. In affirming the trial court, the appellate
division found that each of the victims was wounded in the literal
sense because there was a breaking of the skin. State v. Crumedy,
144 N.J. Super. 25, 30, 364 A.2d 546, 549 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 76
N.J. 319, 387 A.2d 357 (1978). Once the "wounding" element was
found, the totality of the situation could be examined to determine if
the particular conduct should be deemed atrocious. Id. Subsequently,
the defendant's petition for certification to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey was granted. 73 N.J. 46, 372 A.2d 311 (1977).
In affirming the conviction, the supreme court found that since
the "wounding" element proscribed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:90-1
(West 1969), was established by the facts, "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the assault and battery may be examined in
order to ascertain whether the particular conduct may properly be
considered to be 'atrocious.' " 76 N.J. at 321, 387 A.2d at 358. The
court found the primary measure of viciousness to be the character of
the assault, with the substantiality of the injury being a related factor.
Id. These factors are inversely related. The court relied upon State v.
Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 146 A.2d 209 (1958), to support the proposition that the more heinous the act, the less substantial the injuries
need be. Conversely, the less outrageous the act, the more substantial the injuries need be to support a charge of atrocious assault and
battery.
Regarding the nature of the defendant's conduct, the court found
that since the defendant's acts were so loathsome and contemptible,
the slight physical injuries were "sufficiently substantial" to justify a
conviction of atrocious assault and battery. 76 N.J. at 322, 387 A.2d at
359. The court added that the psychological harm the victims may
have suffered, particularly those who were told they had cancer,
made this case much more than a simple assault and battery. Id. at
323, 387 A.2d at 359.
The decision in Crumedy appears to depart from the established
law of New Jersey. In his dissent, Justice Clifford noted that while no
specific intent is required for atrocious assault and battery, it is clear
that the necessary elements of the crime include "savage and cruel
conduct resulting in severe and substantial injuries." Id. at 325, 387
A.2d at 360 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Justice Clifford opined that Edwards stands for the proposition
that although the brutal nature of the attack is given more weight,
the injuries resulting from the attack must be substantial in order to
warrant a conviction of atrocious assault and battery. Id. at 325-26,
387 A.2d at 360 (Clifford, j., dissenting). The victim in Edwards did
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suffer substantial injuries and was hospitalized with bad bruises, lacerations and scratches.
The dissent indicates that the court may have been sidetracked
by the bizarre, lurid facts of the case. The nature of the defendant's
acts was so cruel that the court may have put more weight on the
character of these acts than' upon the severity of the injuries. The
inverse relationship established by the court between the nature of
the act and the substantiality of the injuries may lead to problems in
the future. New possibilities for atrocious assault and battery have
been created as conduct, not actual injury, can be the determinative
factor.

CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super.

89, 385 A.2d 878 (App. Div. 1978).
Donald Mazur, a police officer of the Atlantic City Police Department, was convicted of conspiring with one Lee Cohn to engage
in misconduct in office. Cohn had agreed to give the defendant $500
to intervene with the Atlantic City Deputy Commissioner of Public
Safety and expedite the procurement for Cohn of a retail license to
operate a hotel. After Cohn's license was approved, he met with the
defendant and paid him a $250 installment. The money was supplied
to Cohn by the state. In addition, Detective William Wrotniewski of
the New Jersey State Police equipped Cohn with an electronic
transmitter, enabling him to monitor the conversation accompanying
this transaction, as well as later conversations during which Cohn passed additional money to the defendant.
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could convict the
defendant of conspiracy if they found he agreed with Cohn to commit
the substantive offense. After a verdict of guilty was rendered, the
defendant appealed, claiming that the trial judge's instruction was error. Since Cohn was acting as a government agent, the defendant
argued that Cohn could not have been a "co-conspirator."
The appellate division reversed the lower court decision and ordered a new trial. The court found that under New Jersey law, where
a so-called "co-conspirator" acts as an agent for the prosecution, "the
feigning party is simply not conspiring to commit a crime." 158 N.J.
Super. at 97, 385 A.2d at 882. In so finding, the court expressly overruled the recent decision of State v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 377
A.2d 1255 (Law Div. 1977).
The Lavary court had held that a charge of conspiracy could not
be defended by a claim that the "co-conspirator" could not be con-
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SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:380

victed. The Mazur court found this to be a misinterpretation of precedent, as well as the statute defining conspiracy, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:98-1 (West 1969). With respect to prior case law, the court found
that a conspiracy may be punishable even though its object may be
impossible. The essence of the conspiracy which the courts must address is the shared intent of the parties. Similarly, the Mazur decision found that the statute contains no language encompassing a lone
conspirator, and therefore, the Lavary court had overlooked the
common intent requisite to the crime. 158 N.J. Super. at 99, 385
A.2d at 883.
In addition, the court found that the trial court in Mazur committed reversible error in not permitting Cohn to be impeached by
prior convictions, since no showing was made of an arrangement for
immunity. It was also found that the trial court erred in limiting
cross-examination of Cohn with regard to a welfare fraud investigation.
In overruling Lavary, the court in Mazur has clarified the law in
New Jersey concerning defenses to a charge of conspiracy when one
of the "co-conspirators" is actually an agent for the government. It is
the illegal intent of the parties, not simply their goal, which courts in
the future will be called upon to assess. Circumstances unknown to
the defendant concerning the identity of the other party will be considered where the other party could not have formed the intent to
commit the substantive offense. However, circumstances unknown as
to the impossibility of achieving the substantive offense will not be
exculpatory.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388 A.2d 218 (1978).
On August 13, 1973, Frank Miller was picked up for questioning
in connection with the murder of a seventeen year old girl. Initially,
Miller was read his Miranda rights. A questioning period of nearly an
hour followed, during which the interrogating officer appealed to Miller, telling him that he was Miller's friend, that he would help Miller,
but that Miller had to help himself first by talking. 76 N.J. at 398,
388 A.2d at 221. Eventually, Miller confessed and was indicted for
murder.
At trial, sixteen jurors were sworn in pursuant to N.J.R. 1:8-2(d).
At the conclusion of the trial, twelve were chosen to constitute the
jury and the remaining four were sequestered. After deliberation had
begun, the jury requested and received supplemental instructions
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from the court regarding the distinction between first and second degree murder. Subsequently, prior to resuming deliberations, one
juror asked to be, and was, excused. An alternate juror, who had not
heard the supplemental charges, replaced him. The jury was instructed to "start over" in its deliberations. 76 N.J. at 402, 388 A.2d
at 223. Subsequently, the jury found Miller guilty of first degree
murder. The appellate division, however, reversed Miller's conviction
on the ground that his "confession was the result of intense and
mind-bending psychological compulsion .....
Id. The supreme
court granted certification.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate division's holding, reinstating Miller's conviction. In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that the voluntariness of a confession should be
"assessled] in the totality of all the surrounding circumstances." Id.
Where, as in the present case, the defendant had a complete understanding of his situation, he could not be deemed to have been deluded by the interrogating officer.
The court relied on the criteria set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
for evaluating the circumstances surrounding a suspect's confession.
Among the "relevant factors" the court considered were the intelligence, education and age of the suspect, the period and nature of the
interrogation, advice as to constitutional rights, physical or mental
exhaustion, and whether or not the suspect had any prior encounters
with the law. Id. See also State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 211 A.2d
370 (1965).
The court held that a psychologically-oriented questioning
technique was not inherently coercive when conducted within proper
bounds. 76 N.J. at 405, 388 A.2d at 224. The interrogation of a suspect necessarily involves the use of psychological factors. The mere
fact that the technique applied with Miller caused him to change his
mind and confess does not render the method improper. The court
concluded that the real question "is whether the change of mind was
voluntary and not an overbearing of the suspect's will." Id.
The court then considered the constitutionality of N.J.R. 1:82(d). This rule provides that where good cause is shown, an alternate
juror may be substituted for an excused one. The court found this
provision not to offend our constitutional guaranty of trial by jury,
notwithstanding that deliberations had begun. 76 N.J. at 406, 388
A.2d at 225. The fact that the alternate juror did not receive the
supplementary instructions was deemed non-prejudicial since the
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supplementary instructions were virtually identical to the initial
charge which every juror had heard. 76 N.J. at 408, 388 A.2d at 226.
Judge Conford wrote a vigorous dissent. He did not rely heavily
on the issue of psychologically-oriented questioning techniques, but
rather on the state's failure to meet its burden of establishing beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Id. at 410-12,
388 A.2d at 227-28. Judge Conford felt that the interrogating officer's
conduct was clearly oppressive and overbearing. He also made extensive use of transcripts in attempting to demonstrate how the interrogating officer played on the defendant's emotions by befriending
him and promising him an insanity defense with no prison sentence.
76 N.J. at 414-22, 388 A.2d at 229-34. Judge Conford relied upon
several recent Supreme Court opinions, such as Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1978), to show that such conduct does not comport
with constitutional guarantees that extend to all defendants no matter
how heinous the alleged crime or crimes may be.
Regarding the validity of N.J.R. 1:8-2(d), Judge Conford stated
that while the Rule "is not facially invalid, [it] is susceptible [to]
unconstitutional application." 76 N.J. at 426, 388 A.2d at 235-36. He
based this on the possible taint the excused juror may have had on
the ultimate verdict. Id.
By its holding in Miller, the supreme court indicated its willingness to accept modern law enforcement techniques insofar as they
comport with due process. The court seems to be limiting the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of coercive questioning in favor of
such methods as were used in Miller. This decision may have particular impact as future technological advances seek acceptance by the
judiciary.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-State v. Wiggins, 158 N.J. Super. 27, 385 A.2d 318 (App. Div. 1978).
Leroy Wiggins was charged with robbery, assault with intent to
rob, and atrocious assault and battery. At his trial, a jury was selected
but remained unsworn while defense counsel made several pretrial
motions. After these motions were denied, the defendant engaged in
a verbal exchange with his counsel and the judge. The defendant
concluded the exchange by discharging his attorney and leaving the
courtroom. Before leaving, however, the defendant admitted that he
was not competent to represent himself.
After the defendant's departure, the trial court concluded that
while the defendant should have representation, the court could not
force it on him. The trial was conducted with counsel in the court-
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room, but not participating. The defendant was not present during
the proceedings. The jury returned a guilty verdict after hearing the
prosecution's case and receiving the judge's charge. Id. at 30, 385
A.2d at 319. The defendant appealed on the grounds that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution and the state constitution. Id.
The appellate division, after examining the novel issue of
whether a defendant may waive counsel and then refuse to participate
in his own defense, reversed and remanded. The court deemed it to
be reversible error for the trial to proceed in the defendant's absence
and without representation. Such a trial amounted to an ex parte proceeding rather than the conventional adversarial trial. In finding that
there was no effective waiver of counsel, the court noted that it
would "indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver."
Id. at 31, 385 A.2d at 320. Furthermore, if a waiver did occur, the
court stated that it could not allow a defendant to waive both his right
to counsel and "his right to conduct his own defense." Id. Since no
effective waiver existed, the court held that the trial judge should
have ordered counsel to remain at bar and actively participate in the
defense. Such participation would have convinced the court that the
defendant was afforded his right to a fair trial. Id.
The court based its decision on New Jersey's recognized use of
"standby" counsel, State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967);
State v. Dennis, 45 N.J. 195, 212 A.2d 19 (1965), as well as the need
for the participation of counsel to protect the integrity of the trial
process. "Standby" counsel allows a trial judge to order counsel to
remain in the courtroom and participate whenever necessary, even
when counsel has been dismissed by a defendant. 158 N.J. Super. at
32, 385 A.2d at 320.
The court stated that more was at stake than the interests of this
particular defendant. In effect, the integrity of the entire criminal
trial process required that a defendant be given a fair trial. Id.; see
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 468 (1971). Public interest mandates that a judge be empowered to take steps to insure
this. The need for a fair trial is present even if counsel is rejected by
the defendant.
The decision in Wiggins strengthens the duty of a trial judge to
control a trial in order to insure defendant's rights. It follows the
policy of New Jersey courts to refuse requests to discharge competent
counsel absent "a showing of substantial cause." State v. Lowery, 49
N.J. 476, 231 A.2d 361 (1967); State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 202 A.2d
669 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965). The decision does not

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:380

affect the right to waive counsel and represent one's self. It only
holds that all rights of representation cannot be waived. As such,
Wiggins affects both defendants and trial judges. It restricts actions
by defendants meant to disrupt the trial by requiring the trial judge
to insure some form of representation, even against the will of
defendant.
FAMILY LAW-Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super.
442, 386 A.2d 442 (App. Div. 1978).
The suit in Gross was instituted on behalf of an unemancipated
ten-year old child by his mother as guardian ad litem, and also the
mother individually, against the father and Sears, Roebuck and Co. It
was alleged that the child was injured as a result of his father's negligent operation of a power lawnmower, which was distributed by the
defendant corporation. The trial court dismissed the claim of the child
against his father on a summary judgment motion. The court's reasoning was predicated upon the doctrine of parental immunity. The
plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate division, in reviewing the historical justification for
parental immunity, found that the child-parent immunity rule was
created by the courts as an effort to preserve family harmony and to
prevent the subversion of parental discipline. An added factor which
emerged in later years in support of intrafamilial immunity was the
concern of the judiciary to protect third parties, namely insurance
carriers, from collusive and fraudulent lawsuits between parent and
child.
In its assessment of the prior New Jersey law, the court noted
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in France v. A.P.A. Transport
Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970), overruled its previous holdings which barred the bringing of a suit by a child against his or her
parent for injuries sustained as a result of the parent's negligent operation of an automobile. Tile court in France abrogated the parentchild immunity defense in this particular type of action. Id. In Small
v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974), where a child brought
a wrongful death suit against his father, the court further limited the
use of parental immunity, declaring it to be unavailable in actions
which allege intentional torts. Id. Lastly, the appellate division cited
Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373 (App. Div.
1976), as yet a further step in undercutting the applicability of parental immunity in New Jersey. In Dower, the court held that an unemancipated child was permitted to sue his parent for injuries resulting from a dog bite. Id.
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Relying on the decisions in France and Small, the court in Gross
concluded a fortiori "that the parental immunity doctrine has been
abrogated in New Jersey in all tort cases." 158 N.J. Super. at 445, 386 A.2d
at 444. However, the court, following the lead of Goller v. White, 20
Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), noted two exceptions to the
abolition of the doctrine. First, the defense may be raised "[w]here
the alleged negligent act involved an exercise of parental authority
over the child." 158 N.J. Super. at 446, 386 A.2d at 444, (quoting
from Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d at 198). Second, the defense is
still viable if "the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordiId.
nary parental discretion .....
Noting that these two exceptions draw strict guidelines as to
when a parental immunity defense is appropriate, the court held that
the facts of the immediate case did not fall within either exception
and, therefore, the complaint should not have been dismissed. 158
N.J. Super. at 446, 386 A.2d at 444. Although it was alleged that the
defendant's father had warned his child to "go away," the cause of
action did not come within the "parental authority" exception. Furthermore, the court held that the determination of whether an exception to the abrogation of parental immunity exists should be decided
as a matter of law, rather than an issue of fact. Id. at 448, 386 A.2d at
445. Finally, the court held that if one of the exceptions is asserted as
a defense, the burden of proof rests upon the parent to show that he
falls within one of the two exceptions. Id.
The Gross decision is highly significant in the area of family law
in that it effectively tolls the death knell of parental immunity in New
Jersey. This case afforded the proper factual background whereby a
court could take the step alluded to by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in France and Small and, thus the abolition of child-parent
immunity, except in two limited instances, was solidified. The result
is that the outmoded justifications which barred children's suits
against their parents have finally been replaced with "practical
economic and social realities" which were long overdue. Id. at 445,
386 A.2d at 444.

FAMILY LAW-Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951
(1978).
On September 2, 1974, Barbara and Allen Merenoff were trimming the bushes in front of their home. Mrs. Merenoff was having
some difficulty with a particular bush so her husband attempted to

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:380

help her. As he was clipping the bush with a hedge trimmer, Mr.
Merenoff cut off his wife's left index finger at the first phalanx. Mrs.
Merenoff commenced a tort action against her husband on April 17,
1975, for her injury. In his answer, Mr. Merenoff alleged that the
plaintiff's injuries were the result of her own negligence and furthermore, that her claim was barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
The court granted summary judgment to the husband on the
ground that interspousal tort immunity barred the action brought by
the wife. The plaintiff-wife filed a notice of appeal in the appellate
division and then moved for direct certification to the supreme court
pursuant to Rule 2:12-2.
In the companion case, Santos Mercado bought two one-gallon
cans of Canolite Contact Cement on or about October 20, 1972. The
can was labeled "flammable" and although Santos was unable to read
English, he had prior experience as a painter and was, therefore,
accustomed to the appropriate connotation of the word. While Santos
was applying the cement to some formica in his kitchen, his wife
entered the kitchen and stood near a gas stove. Subsequently, a flame
leapt from the pilot light in the stove and ignited a nearby cement
can. Mrs. Mercado, who was in the direct path of the flame, was
severely burned.
Mrs. Mercado filed suit against her husband for her injuries on
June 11, 1973. Santos denied negligence and set forth the defenses of
the plaintiff-wife's own negligence and interspousal immunity. Summary judgment was granted by the trial court in favor of the
defendant-husband. The appellate division affirmed the decision
based upon the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The supreme
court considered the plaintiff's petition for certification together with
the petition in the Merenoff case and subsequently certified both
cases.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, speaking through Justice
Handler, first noted the efficacy of the doctrine of interspousal* immunity in other jurisdictions. It became apparent that the application
of the doctrine was far from consistent, and its utility had merely
served to confound the courts, legislators and commentators. 76 N.J.
at 542, 388 A.2d at 955. Justice Handler thus concluded that "interspousal immunity is no longer the doctrinal monolith it was in
olden times." Id.
In the past, the courts of New Jersey have also displayed confusion, thus "typif[ying] the unstable interaction between a common
law tradition whose potency has waned in modern times and statutory
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laws of uncertain import." Id. at 543, 388 A.2d at 955. After considering marital tranquility as possible justification for the continued application of marital immunity to such torts as in the cases at bar, the
supreme court finally concluded that this could not be grounds for
denying relief. Id. at 552, 388 A.2d at 960.
The inherent danger of such a decision is the possibility of fraud
and collusion against insurance companies. However, the court expressed confidence, as it had done in the case of Immer v. Risko, 56
N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), that our judicial system is wellequipped to sift out fraud.
Justice Handler recognized that there may still remain situations
wherein marital claims for personal injury will not justify recovery of
damages. However, since there presently exists no logical nexus for
denying such claims, the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity need
not be continued. The doctrine was thus abrogated as a bar to any
civil litigation between spouses for personal injury damages. The
court must be circumspect when examining such interspousal tort
claims. The activity of each case must present a distinct element of
special damage and an unusual risk of injury or harm, along with a
consideration of the traumatic nature of the injuries suffered.
Since this decision significantly changes the prior New Jersey law
represented by the decision in these cases, these areas of caution
must be addressed. One must remember that the asserted tortious
conduct in these cases does not and will not remove the privileged or
consensual aspects of married life. The court also cautions that the
burden of proof applicable to negligence actions in general, by a preponderance of the evidence, is not to be altered in interspousal tort
cases. If flaws are revealed in this new approach, our judicial system
will not hesitate to select a burden of proof or a standard of care
which will adequately address the problem of interspousal tort actions.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-CRIMINAL LAW-White v. Violent
Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1978).
Elizabeth White was the victim of a brutal assault and rape from
which she sustained severe bodily injuries. Apparently, she was
under the belief "that her crime-related losses would be 'taken care of
when the criminal case was over.' " 76 N.J. at 371, 388 A.2d at 207.
Approximately one year after the assault, she was told that her assailant had already been convicted and sentenced. She was also informed
at this time that her only avenue of relief would be to retain her own
lawyer and bring a civil suit against the person who attacked her.
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This was the first time the plaintiff learned that the Prosecutor's office
would not attempt to remedy her financial losses caused by the
crime.
Subsequently, the plaintiff and her counsel learned of the existence of the Violent Crimes Compensation Board (Board), which provides financial relief to victims of violent crimes. By the time the
plaintiff received the proper forms and mailed them back to the
Board, one year and two months had passed since her assault. The
Act which created the Board, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21
(West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), requires all claims be filed within one
year of the crime. Consequently, the Board refused White's request
for relief. The Board did note, however, that had she filed her claim
within the time allowed, she would have been entitled to compensation for her injuries.
On appeal, the appellate division -affirmed the Board's determination. The court held that the time limit set forth in the statute was a
condition precedent to eligibility for compensation. The plaintiff's
claim was thus barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the
court found no power to relax the time requirement in a case of hardship.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in an opinion by Justice
Pashman, reversed and remanded, holding that the statute of limitations did not toll until plaintiff recuperated from her crime-induced
incapacity. 76 N.J. at 384, 388 A.2d at 214. Thus, the plaintiff was
within the required one-year limitation when she filed her request
with the Board.
The court relied upon American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), in its examination of the propriety of tolling the statute of limitations. There the Supreme Court had held that the
test was not whether a time limitation is procedural or substantive, but
whether the legislative intent would be satisfied by tolling the time
limit. The fact that a federal statute sets a time limitation on when a
suit may be instituted did not restrict the power of the federal courts
to toll the statute in situations where it would be consistent with
legislative intent. The New Jersey supreme court in White, while noting that its inherent judicial power under N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1,
para. 1, is at least as broad as that of the United States Supreme
Court, adopted this view and allowed the statute of limitations to be
tolled in certain situations. This tolling would be dependent upon
whether the legislative intent in creating the statute would be accomplished.
The court, in examining the purpose behind N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:4B-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), found it to be basically a
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humane attempt at alleviating the financial suffering by innocent victims of violent crimes. The function of the statute of limitations, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), was to insure
that only bona fide victims of violent crimes would receive compensation. The time limit was included to aid verification of factual information used in claims to the Board.
White presented a situation in which the court felt that the intent of the legislature would be effectuated by tolling the statute of
limitations. 76 N.J. at 379, 388 A.2d at 211. The nature and extent of
the crime caused a period of incapacity fbr the plaintiff'. During this
period, the court believed that the plaintiff could not have filed her
claim with the Board. Accordingly, the statute of limitations should
have tolled when the plaintiff was capable of filing her claim. Thus,
she would be entitled to the full year provided in the statute. The
court noted that the purpose of the time limitation would in no way
be frustrated, as the Board would be able to verify the factual bases
of each of the plaintiff's claims.
The possible negative effects of White were suggested in a dissent written by Judge Conford and joined by Justice Clifford. Many
claimants who had previously been barred from recovery due to the
statute of limitations may now come forward and claim some crimeinduced incapacity that may toll the time limit in their case. Arguably, the majority has added a provision to the statute where the
legislature had remained silent. Furthermore, the decision may cause
hardship to the functioning of the Board. The possible flood of claimants created by the holding could have the effect of administratively
burdening the Board to the point of ineffectiveness. This could result
in the limited funds becoming unattainable to the class of victims
which the legislature intended to assist by enacting the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).

RECORDS-RIGHT TO KNOW LAW-Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213,
386 A.2d 846 (1978).
John Nero, a one-time prospective appointee to the New Jersey
Lottery Commission, filed an action in lieu of prerogative writ requesting access to character investigative files, pursuant to the Right
to Know Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1A-1 to -4 (West Cum. Supp.
1978-1979). As Governor Byrne revealed at a news conference, these
files formed the foundation for a recommendation by Attorney Gen-
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eral Hyland to the Governor that Nero not be named to the post
because of certain information that had been unearthed by a "fourway" background check. By letter, Attorney General Hyland refused
a demand by Nero to see the files stating that the character reports
were confidential.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the files were not public records under the Right to Know
Law standing by itself. However, reading the definition of a public
record as contained in that law in pari materia with the definition set
forth in the Destruction of Public Records Law, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 47:3-15 to -32 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), the trial court found
the character investigative reports to be public records. Nevertheless,
the trial court noted that the Governor, pursuant to executive order,
had a right to exempt certain records from public disclosure as enumerated in section 2 of the Right to Know Law. 76 N.J. at 218-19,
386 A.2d at 849. Thus, disclosure was not mandated in this case.
The appellate division substantially agreed with the trial court's
opinion but reversed and remanded. It held that the lower court
should have conducted an in camera inspection of the files to determine if any portion of the information should have been revealed,
particularly in view of the public statements made by a government
official which impliedly derogated an individual's character.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey assessed error to both lower
courts in their formulation of the definition of a public record by
reading the two statutes in conjunction with each other. The supreme
court held that the character file simply was not a public record in
view of the "unambiguous" language contained in the Right to Know
Law. Id. at 212, 386 A.2d at 850-51.
The court did find that the common law definition of a public
record is broader than that embraced in the statute and hence the
records would be public information. However, the court determined
that Nero's interest must be balanced against the public's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the files. The supreme court
concluded that an executive privilege existed for the protection of
communications which are essential to the executive function in
accomplishing effective investigative procedures which aid the Governor in his decisional responsibilities. The court held that the executive privilege in maintaining the confidentiality of character files
stood in the stead of the public interest and, therefore, outweighed
the plaintiff's interest in disclosure. Id. at 226, 386 A.2d at 853.
The result of this decision is somewhat ironic in that the court
interpreted the common law definition of a public record to be more
sweeping than that contained in the so-called Right to Know Law. It

1978]

SURVEY

399

appears that the "liberation" of government records, as envisaged by
the citizens of New Jersey when the Right to Know Law became
effective, took one step backward in terms of the statute as read by
the top court of the state. Nevertheless, the statute and common law
are virtually meaningless because in the final analysis there must still
be another level of injury, which is manifested in balancing the public
interest against the individual's interest.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS- DISCRIMINATION:
SEX-Castellano v. Linden Board of Education, 158 N.J. Super.
350, 386 A.2d 396 (App. Div. 1978).
Linda Castellano, a tenured first grade teacher, became pregnant
and gave birth on August 29, 1974. She had asked the Linden Board
of Education (Board) for sick leave, planning to offset accumulated
sick leave time against her absence. When she informed the Board of
her desire to return to her teaching duties, she was told that she
could not do so until July 1, 1975. Although her ability to resume
work as of September 27, 1974, was medically certified, she was advised by the Superintendent of Schools that under the terms of the
employment contract, she would have to take a maternity leave of
absence for the remaining eleven months of the school year. A need
to " 'establigh some stability in the classroom' " was advanced by way
of explanation. 158 N.J. Super. at 354, 386 A.2d at 398. The collectively negotiated agreement between the Board and the Linden Education Association for the particular academic year did, in fact, contain a provision requiring a pregnant teacher to take a mandatory
leave of absence and to submit a written request to return at the
beginning of either of the next two school years. The provision dealing with allowable sick leave and its accumulation made no special
reference to absence due to childbirth. These contract provisions
served as a basis for the Board's denial of complainant's request.
Subsequently, a complaint was filed with the Division of Civil
Rights (Division). A hearing followed at which the hearing examiner
determined that the sick leave policy violated the Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979), and recommended that complainant be awarded
damages for lost earnings and mental suffering. The Director of the
Division, adopting the report and recommendations of the hearing
examiner, ordered the Board to cease and desist from discriminating
in employment on the basis of sex as prohibited by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-4, -12(a). Additionally, the order directed the Board to: first,
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treat pregnancy like any other temporary disability; second, permit
teachers to utilize accumulated sick leave for pregnancy-related disabilities; third, permit teachers to return to work after maternity
leave as soon as they are willing and physically able; and fourth, extend the provisions of leave for child care to male, as well as female,
employees. 158 N.J. Super. at 355, 386 A.2d at 399. The Board, its
president and the superintendent of schools appealed.
The appellate division affirmed the order in all its major aspects.
However, that portion dealing with child care leave of absence for
men was vacated as being beyond the scope of the case. The court
held that the provision regarding mandatory -leave of absence discriminated against the complainant on the basis of sex and constituted
a violation of the Law Against Discrimination. Id. at 356, 386 A.2d at
399. The court could not perceive any rational basis for a rule which
"arbitrarily and without medical reasons prevents a physically capable
woman from returning to her job simply because the temporary disability is occasioned by pregnancy." Id. at 357, 386 A.2d at 400. The
court refused to concede that the valid need for "continuity of instruction" amounted to a "business necessity," particularly since
pregnancy-related disabilities had been singled out for such concern.
Id. Furthermore, the fact that the policy was part of a collectively
negotiated agreement did not make it lawful, since rights assured by
the Law Against Discrimination cannot be bargained away. Id. at 358,
386 A.2d at 400.
The court also held that depriving a pregnant employee of sick
leave benefits for absence due to childbirth constituted discrimination, since such benefits are intended to alleviate economic losses resulting from inability to work because of physical disability. To
exclude pregnancy-related absences merely because this medical condition may not be an illness in the conventional sense of the word
was found to run counter to the clearly enunciated policy of this state
against discrimination, as embodied in N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 5.
The court acknowledged a similarity of subject matter between
this case and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1976), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a disability benefits plan which specifically
excluded from coverage pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West
1976). The court did not dwell on distinguishing Gilbert, since it involved merely " 'an insurance package, which covers some risks, but
excludes others,"' Castellano, 158 N.J. Super. at 359, 386 A.2d at
401 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138), but
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asserted its freedom to interpret a state statute through application of
its own concept of justice. 158 N.J. Super. at 360, 368 A.2d at 401.
Accordingly, the court found the complainant entitled to utilize accumulated sick leave for her absence on account of childbirth and
confirmed the awards of back pay and damages for pain and suffering.
Id. at 363, 386 A.2d at 402.
Castellano clarifies New Jersey law on two important aspects of
sex discrimination in employment. First, pregnancy may not be singled out, without business necessity or other justification, as the basis
for a mandatory level of absence beyond the duration of the disability. Second, the statutory definition of "sick leave," N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:30-1 (West 1968), includes temporary absence fbr maternity
reasons. Even though Castellano does not conflict with the recent
holding in Gilchrist v. Haddonfield Board of Education, 155 N.J.
Super. 358, 382 A.2d 946 (App. Div. 1978) (sex discrimination not
found in nonrenewal of nontenured pregnant teacher's contract), a
valuable distinction has been drawn.
In recent years, the New Jersey supreme court has afforded the
citizens of this state greater protection under New Jersey constitutional and statutory provisions, often despite identical language in
their federal counterparts. Clearly, the decision in Castellano is
another example of this laudable trend.

LAW-In the Matter of an
In-Progress Trace of a Wire Communication to be Made to and
Intercepted Over Telephone Facility Number, Etc., 76 N.J. 255,
386 A.2d 1295 (1978).

WIRETAPPING-CONSTITUTIONAL

In order to facilitate the prosecutor's investigation of a gambling
operation, the Essex County Assignment Judge authorized the installation of a wire tap on a particular telephone. Subsequently, the prosecutor, desirous of ascertaining the identity of a person calling the
tapped phone, requested the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company to
make an in-progress trace. When this request was rejected, the prosecutor obtained an order to show cause why the telephone company
should not be compelled to provide technical assistance in making the
trace. The Assignment Judge denied the order, reasoning that this
"new interception" could not be ordered absent the appropriate
supporting affidavits and that no "technical assistance" was necessary to
intercept the currently tapped phone. 76 N.J. at 258, 386 A.2d at
1296.
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The appellate division reversed, holding that the New Jersey
Wiretapping & Electronic Surveillance Act (New Jersey Act), N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(expired July 1, 1978), permits the use of an in-progress trace in
order to ascertain the identity of a caller to the intercepted phone.
138 N.J. Super. 404, 351 A.2d 356 (App. Div. 1975).
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision and
reinstated the order of the Assignment Judge. The court held that the
in-progress trace could not be ordered by a court "on the basis of and
as part of an intercept order of [a tapped] telephone." 76 N.J. at 267,
386 A.2d at 1301. The court premised its decision on the individual's
right to privacy protected by the federal and state constitutions. Id. at
260-61, 386 A.2d at 1298. Further support for its position was found
in the legislative history of the New Jersey Act and the federal law
from which our state law was patterned. The court noted that the
New Jersey Act originally contained language requiring communication common carriers to furnish all necessary assistance to make an
"in-progress" trace, but this provision was later deleted. Id. at 26667, 386 A.2d at 1300-01. Narrow construction was, therefore,
deemed appropriate in view of the legislature's "carefully crafted statute." Id. at 268, 386 A.2d at 1302.
Justice Handler, in an opinion joined by Justice Sullivan, dissented and criticized the majority for their "cramped" reading of the
New Jersey Act. Id. at 269, 386 A.2d at 1302. The dissent expressed
that the "dominant intent of the [liegislature was to vest in [s]tate law
enforcement officers broad and firm authority with respect to obtaining technical assistance in conducting wiretap surveillances." Id. at
282, 386 A.2d at 1309. The ordinary procedures, including inprogress traces, performed by the telephone company in conjunction
with legal intercepts were viewed as part of this authority by the
dissenting justices. Emphasis was placed on the need to balance privacy considerations against the needs of law enforcement in fighting
organized crime.
The majority's rejection of this balancing approach evidences
strong concern for the constitutionally protected right to privacy. The
court adopted the better approach which is to narrowly read the clear
terms of the New Jersey Act.
M.G.B.
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